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Introduction1 
After a heated internal debate about the wisdom of selling supposedly ‘nuclear capable’ 
Jaguar strike aircraft to India, in mid-1975 British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan 
commented ‘I think we cannot refuse the order.’2 This was neither the beginning nor the 
end of an issue that spanned four years and saw domestic economic imperatives collide 
with global non-proliferation policy. Not only were there lengthy debates within 
London’s corridors of power, the Jaguar sale also drew in Jimmy Carter’s 
administration, as unlike its more powerful ally, the British government refused to 
subordinate economic wellbeing to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. 
The debate originated in British Aircraft Corporation’s (BAC) negotiations with 
India to sell the Jaguar in a deal worth millions of pounds and thousands of jobs to the 
teetering British aerospace industry.3 By 1973, trade counted for nearly 40 per cent of 
the UK’s GDP.4 In the fraught economic atmosphere of the 1970s, the revenue from 
arms sales was more vital than ever. The provision of advanced aircraft to non-aligned 
(but part of the Commonwealth) India fitted into a long lasting set of US-UK 
disagreements and disputes regarding trade that primarily focused on the communist, 
																																																								
1 I would like to thank all those who have given feedback on various drafts of this article, in particular Fabian 
Hilfrich, Frances Houghton, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Robert Mason, Mark McLay, Benoit Pelopidas, and Andrew 
Preston, all of whom offered invaluable comments that helped to revise and strengthen this piece. I have also been 
very appreciative of the opportunities to gain further feedback from the University of Edinburgh American History 
Workshop and Centre for the Study of Modern Conflict, the Historians of the Twentieth Century United States 
conference, and the Scottish Association for the Study of America conference. 
2 Dales to Wright, ‘Sale of Jaguar Aircraft to India,’ 9 June, 1975, The National Archives of the UK (hereafter TNA) 
Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (hereafter FCO) 37/1627 
3 In 1977, BAC was consolidated with Hawker Siddeley and Scottish Aviation to become British Aerospace (BA) as 
the government nationalised the aircraft and shipbuilding industries. 
4 Jim Tomlinson, ‘Economic Policy,’ in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History 
of Modern Britain (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 191; Jeffrey A. Engel, Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-
American Fight for Aviation Supremacy (Harvard University Press, 2007), 11. 
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rather than non-aligned, world.5 But as Paul McGarr observes, issues such as Jaguar 
were not new. During the 1950s and 60s, successive UK governments found themselves 
attempting to balance diplomatic and financial interests on the subcontinent alongside 
competing Cold War and regional demands from the US, India, and Pakistan.6 Indeed, 
the sale of Hawker Hunter aircraft to India in the 1960s had provoked a similar US-UK 
confrontation.7 
The Jaguar deal, however, was complicated by the UK’s active engagement in 
non-proliferation diplomacy on the sub-continent. From the mid-1970s onwards the 
USA and UK worked together to prevent Pakistan from purchasing a nuclear 
reprocessing plant (that could produce fissile plutonium) from France. Moreover, from 
1978 onwards, there were intertwined efforts to combat Islamabad’s clandestine 
uranium enrichment programme, which Britain had monitored since 1976 and alerted 
the US government to in 1977.8 Successive Prime Ministers had positioned the UK as a 
leading anti-proliferation voice. During the 1960s, Harold Wilson’s government had 
engaged in the debates on many ‘nuclear sharing’ plans as non-proliferation measures. 
Although these plans were ultimately fruitless, the end of the 1960s saw the creation of 
the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), of which Britain was 
one of three depository powers. Further emphasis was given to non-proliferation by 
Britain’s commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations, and its key role in 
the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG).  
																																																								
5 See, for example, Frank Cain, Economic Statecraft During the Cold War (Routledge, 2007); Alan P. Dobson, The 
Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship 1940-1987 (Wheatsheaf Books, 1988); Engel, Cold 
War at 30,000 Feet; Christopher Hull, ‘Our Arms in Havana: British Military Sales to Batista and Castro, 1958-59,’ 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18:3 (September 2007), 593-616 and ‘“Going to War in Buses”: The Anglo-American 
Clash over Leyland Sales to Cuba, 1963-1964,’ Diplomatic History, 34:5 (November 2010), 793-822. 
6 Paul McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States, and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945-1965 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013), 351 
7 Mark Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964 (Manchester University Press, 2000), 130-131 
8 See Malcolm Craig, ‘The United Kingdom, the United States, and Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Case of 
Pakistan, 1974-1980,’ (University of Edinburgh; PhD Diss., 2014) 
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Although the Indian nuclear test of May 1974 motivated Henry Kissinger’s 
drive for what became the NSG, it was only during the 1976 US election – when 
presidential aspirant Jimmy Carter made non-proliferation a key strand of his campaign 
– that Ford and his advisers started to give non-proliferation a much higher profile.9 
Taking office in January 1977, the Carter administration was especially focused on non-
proliferation and conventional arms control, with Carter’s anti-reprocessing position 
creating tension between the US and European nuclear supplier states. Throughout this 
period, the Ford and Carter administrations used arms sales as a diplomatic tool – to 
either bribe or coerce – in nuclear negotiations with the governments of Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto (Pakistani Prime Minister, 1973-77) and Muhammad Zia ul-Haq (Pakistani 
President, 1977-88).10 However, it was only from 1977 onwards that the United States 
put pressure on the UK’s Jaguar negotiations with India. 
Britain’s position was muddled by the perception that the Jaguar could deliver 
nuclear weapons. The sale of potentially nuclear capable aircraft to India demonstrated 
that in times of economic crisis, the British government – despite claims of leading non-
proliferation status – was unwilling to prioritise non-proliferation over economic self-
interest. While British ministers and officials were fully aware of the non-proliferation 
arguments, successive Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries chose to wilfully ignore 
the nuclear implications inherent in their arms sales policy. The negotiations and 
eventual deal were contentious in terms of domestic, inter-departmental relations within 
the British government, where non-financial opposition to the sale was vested almost 
solely in the Arms Control and Disarmament Department (ACDD) of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO). 
																																																								
9 William Burr, ‘A “Scheme of Control”: The United States and the Origins of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, 1974-
76’, The International History Review, 36:2 (2014), 252-276. 
10 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies: The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2001), 215-255. 
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The arguments used for and against selling the Jaguar to India varied in their 
strength and deployment but serve to illustrate the collision between domestic and 
foreign policy. The contention that the deal was vital for a troubled British economy 
ultimately proved irresistible. Minor arguments for the sale spoke of moving India away 
from increased cooperation with the USSR, and of not letting French competitors beat 
British industry. In opposition, the primary argument for internal and external critics 
(such as the Carter administration) were rooted in what Alan Dobson describes as the 
sale’s ‘symbolic meaning.’ 11 In the Jaguar’s case, this symbolism was twofold. Firstly, 
opponents of the deal contended that supplying advanced aircraft to India demonstrated 
to the world that there were few consequences to India’s detonation of a nuclear device 
in May 1974. Secondly, the symbolism of an aircraft that had – in British service – an 
offensive nuclear role would (and did) alarm Pakistan, the very nation that America and 
Britain were attempting to dissuade from pursuing the nuclear option. Critics also 
perceived the aircraft – whether correctly or not – as potentially altering the strategic 
military balance on the sub-continent. Thus, the major arguments against the sale – 
within the British government and between Washington and London – focused on the 
‘symbolic, communicative effects of economic statecraft’ rather than economic 
realities.12 
This article thus poses three main questions: a) What consideration was given to 
the issue of non-proliferation during the Jaguar discussions? b) How did the US attempt 
to influence the British position in favour of non-proliferation objectives? c) Why – 
when Britain positioned itself as a leading non-proliferation voice – did the Wilson and 
Callaghan governments pursue the sale with such vigour and risk damaging that 
standing? There already exists a considerable literature on Cold War Anglo-American 
																																																								
11 Alan P. Dobson, US Economic Statecraft for Survival, 1933-1991 (Routledge, 2002), 1-2 
12 Ibid, 3 
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economic relations and arms sales.13 There is, however, little consideration within the 
extant literature of the role played by arms sales in a nuclear non-proliferation context. 
This article begins to fill this gap in the scholarship by utilising recently released 
archival information from both sides of the Atlantic. By examining an overlooked 
incident, this article thus adds to the complexity of nuclear non-proliferation history in 
the 1970s by offering an example of the interactions between the domestic priorities and 
the non-proliferation policy of an outwardly ‘leading’ anti-proliferationist state. 
 
‘Immense benefit to British industry’ 
BAC’s negotiations with India over a ‘deep penetration strike aircraft’ (DPSA) only 
became a major concern after the ‘Smiling Buddha’ nuclear detonation of 18 May 1974. 
The Indian test – positioned by Indira Gandhi as a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ – was a 
watershed.14 The explosion had implications far beyond the sub-continent and, as 
Michael J. Brenner contends, the test ‘blew a psychological hole in the world’s 
confident perception of how difficult it was for a marginally proficient state to build a 
bomb, and how hard it was to evade safeguards against the surreptitious exploitation of 
a nominally civilian program.’15 The test was also a turning point that set India’s 
neighbour Pakistan irrevocably along the nuclear weapons path.16 Having fought three 
major wars since partition of the British Raj in 1947, India’s ascent to nuclear status 
only increased the tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi. In Anglo-American 
discussions, the test was recognised as a watershed, but neither Henry Kissinger or Jim 
																																																								
13 See for example the cited works by Cain, Dobson, Engel, and Phythian.. 
14 Michael Hornsby, ‘Critics of India's 'peaceful' atomic device test say it is one step towards a bomb,’ The Times, 20 
May, 1974, 7. 
15 Michael J. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-proliferation: The Remaking of U.S Policy (Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 64. 
16 Samina Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,’ International 
Security, 23:4 (Spring, 1999), 183-184. 
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Callaghan – who maintained warm personal relations – expressed any desire to come 
down hard on New Delhi.17 
Conventional arms sales were tied to the nuclear issue in Pakistan from the very 
instant of the Indian test. Not only did the US government attempt to use weapons sales 
as a means of discouraging Pakistani nuclear aspirations, Britain also found itself mired 
in the issue through its long-running efforts to sell advanced aircraft to India (BAC, 
with the support of the government, had been competing to sell India the Jaguar as early 
as 1967).18 However, there were stark differences in the reasons for, and effects of, 
conventional arms sales to the sub-continental neighbours. American offers of arms to 
Pakistan aimed to lessen Islamabad’s security anxieties regarding India – through their 
provision or withdrawal – to bribe or coerce Islamabad into abandoning its atomic 
ambitions. By the 1970s, Britain found itself mired in an ‘unparalleled economic crisis’, 
a situation where governments saw the British aircraft industry as an essential revenue 
generator.19Any major sales opportunity was therefore vital, even though British 
governments had faced the challenging task of balancing sales to the two regional rivals 
ever since the 1947 partition of the Raj.20 
After the 18 May test, the FCO’s South Asia Department (SAD) – with the 
concurrence of the ACDD, the Far Eastern Department, and the East European and 
Soviet Department – realised that the potential British sale of a ‘nuclear-capable’ strike 
aircraft such as the Jaguar (which had just entered Royal Air Force service in the 
tactical nuclear strike role) to India might be regarded by Pakistan with ‘great 
																																																								
17 ‘Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Energy; North Sea Oil; Foreign Assistance; Nuclear Non-Proliferation; CSCE; 
Trade Bill,’ 7 July, 1974, Wilson Center Digital Archive, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119774 
(accessed on 25 October, 2014) 
18 Prior to 1974, non-proliferation was absent from discussions about the Jaguar deal. None of the relevant files  
mention nuclear issues. 
19 Harold Wilson, Final Term: The Labour Government, 1974-1976 (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1979), 13. The 1970s 
were a lean time for Britain’s aerospace industry, having been a successful exporter for the previous two decades. 
Manufacturers found themselves in a position where potential purchasers would not consider replacing their 
equipment until the 1980s. See Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, 19. 
20 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, 130. 
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suspicion.’21 Sir Michael Cary, Permanent Under-secretary at the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD), argued that the Jaguar was not a new capability for India, which had a fleet of 
aging but serviceable Canberra bombers that could be adapted for nuclear delivery.22 Sir 
Thomas Brimelow, Cary’s opposite number in the FCO, countered that selling the 
Jaguars to New Delhi was inconceivable in light of the nuclear test. The Indians 
required subtle notification so as not to wound their pride, but could be mollified by the 
sale of less controversial equipment such as the Nimrod patrol aircraft.23 David 
Summerhayes, ACDD chief, argued that wider knowledge of British intent to 
potentially sell supposed nuclear delivery systems to India would have a significant, 
damaging impact on the standing of the UK as a global anti-proliferation voice.24 
Summerhayes’ colleague, Assistant Under Secretary of State John Thomson agreed, 
stating the primacy of non-proliferation policy and arguing, ‘if ever there was a moral 
cause, it is this.’25 Thus, the battle lines over the symbolism (if not the reality) of Jaguar 
were drawn. 
In the wake of the May test, Wilson’s government delayed giving a definitive 
answer to the Indians over the specifics of their Jaguar offer, blaming a wrangle over 
credit terms. Internally, non-proliferation considerations played a significant role in 
arguments over the Jaguar, but in British-Indian discussions, British representatives 
persistently emphasised the financial obstacles.26 Indeed, there were genuine economic 
arguments against the sale. India was judged a poor credit risk and extending assistance 
to New Delhi would be at the expense of more credit-worthy potential customers. The 
nuclear test had only complicated this already perplexing situation.27 Favouring the sale 
																																																								
21 Seaward to Wilford, ‘Implications of the Indian Nuclear Test,’ 29 May, 1974, TNA FCO66/654. 
22 Cary to Brimelow, ‘Relations With India,’ 10 June, 1974, TNA FCO66/655, 2. 
23 Brimelow to Cary, ‘Relations With India,’ 13 June, 1974, TNA FCO66/655, 2. 
24 Summerhayes to Thomson et al, ‘Indian Nuclear Test,’ 13 June, 1974, TNA FCO66/655, 3. 
25 Thomson, attachment to: Summerhayes to Thomson et al, ‘Indian Nuclear Test,’ 13 June, 1974, TNA FCO66/655.. 
26 Walker to Cary, ‘Corvettes and Jaguars for India,’ 16 August, 1974, TNA FCO66/658, 2-3 
27 Chalmers to Male, ‘Sale of Jaguar Aircraft to India,’ 20 August 1974, TNA FCO66/658, 1. 
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were Secretary of State for Industry Tony Benn and Secretary of Defence Roy Mason. 
Benn recognised that the May test was concerning, but argued that the sale would be a 
huge boost to the British aircraft industry.28 On the other side were the Treasury – 
where Indian demands for generous credit terms prompted objections – and FCO 
departments such as the ACDD that emphasised nuclear non-proliferation’s 
significance.29 Institutionally, the Treasury – despite irritation that the High 
Commission in New Delhi had been encouraging the Indians – were happy to take a 
‘hands off’ approach to the entire affair and let the FCO and MoD handle matters, 
unless serious demands were made for credit.30 Eventually, however, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Dennis Healy agreed to refer the issue to the high-level Defence and Oversea 
Policy Committee (OPD) for further consideration.31 Both sides in the debate, however, 
highlighted the deal’s ‘immense benefit to British industry.’32  
ACDD – the department with the greatest institutional commitment to non-
proliferation – concentrated on the symbolism of the sale, arguing that selling Jaguars to 
India would have a negative impact on Britain’s general anti-proliferation efforts. Arms 
control officials contended that, ‘[A] British decision to supply Jaguar and thus improve 
India’s nuclear delivery capability would be interpreted on all sides as showing that we 
are not really serious about containing nuclear proliferation and that we give narrow 
commercial and industrial interests a higher priority than this major issue of world 
																																																								
28 Benn to Callaghan, Letter, 8 August, 1974, TNA FCO66/657. 
29 ‘Brief for Meeting of PUS With Indian Defence Secretary Mr Govind Narain’, 5 June, 1974, TNA, Records 
Created or Inherited by HM Treasury (hereafter T) 362/53, 3 
30 Rich to Boothroyd, ‘India: Defence Sales’, 5 June, 1974, TNA T362/53; Rich to Kelley, ‘Sale of Jaguar Aircraft to 
India’, 13 August, 1974, TNA T362/53. 
31 Healy to Callaghan, ‘Jaguar Sales to India’, 6 September, 1974, TNA T362/53. 
32 Callaghan to Benn, ‘Jaguar Sales to India,’ Letter, 23 August, 1974, TNA FCO66/658, 1; Mason to Benn, Letter, 2 
September, 1974, TNA FCO66/658. 
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security.’33 The ministerial OPD’s official counterpart – OPD(O) – realised that this 
could thus lead to prejudice against Britain at the 1975 NPT Review Conference.34 
There followed a paper analysing Anglo-Indian relations circulated by Brimelow, 
drafted by the FCO Planning Staff, and approved by Callaghan. The paper made the 
case that, absent any real chance of significantly moving India away from Soviet arms 
purchases: 
[T]he justification for continued major British arms sales to India must therefore 
rest on the value of such arms sales to our own economy either through the 
payments received for them or through the contribution they make to the 
workload of certain of our own industries.35 
 
Furthermore, analysts downplayed the symbolism of selling allegedly nuclear capable 
aircraft and the impact this might have on Pakistan in favour of stressing the economic 
benefits. Pakistan was, the Planning Staff argued, much less important than India. 
Pakistani objections to the deal were better countered with parallel sales rather than 
restricting supplies to India. Finally, the analysts contended that should India request 
actual nuclear capable aircraft, the government might need to consider an embargo.36 
This assessment wilfully ignored the fact that, regardless of the reality, the 
Jaguar was already seen in Islamabad and other quarters as a nuclear bomber. Here was 
an explicit recognition – approved at the highest level – that a nuclear capable aircraft 
was genuinely and symbolically different from other arms, although the FCO, MoD, 
and other departments repeatedly emphasised that India would not be offered the 
nuclear capable version of the aircraft. As Jeffrey Engel argues in relation to aircraft 
sales to the communist world, Britain ‘consistently downplayed security threats’ 
																																																								
33 ACDD Brief, ‘OPD (Official) Committee Meeting: 2.30pm. 15 October 1974; Defence Sales to India,’ 14 October, 
1974, TNA FCO66/659, 1-2. 
34 Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee, Sub-committee on Strategic Exports (hereafter OPDO-SE), 
‘Credit for Sale of Defence Equipment to India’, 15 October, 1974, TNA Records of the Cabinet Office (hereafter 
CAB) 148/152, 2. 
35 Brimelow to Heads of Department et al, ‘British Policy Towards India,’ 4 November, 1974, TNA FCO66/660, 9. 
36 Ibid. 
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whenever the government saw those threats as imperilling sales.37 The same pattern can 
be observed in relation to the Jaguar sale: the impact on Pakistan’s security and the 
symbolism of selling allegedly nuclear-capable aircraft was downplayed in favour of 
stressing the economic benefits to the UK. 
The Jaguar deal was still primarily viewed by the wider government through the 
lens of economic necessity: bringing in hundreds of millions of pounds to British 
industry, securing thousands of jobs, boosting the aircraft’s further marketability, and 
providing a counterbalance to creeping Soviet sub-continental influence. At this stage, 
Pakistan was only really considered as possibly desiring equal treatment.38 At the higher 
levels, the British government gave little consideration to the impact on the Pakistani 
drive for nuclear weapons of the sale of what observers believed was a nuclear strike 
aircraft to the nation that was the catalyst for Pakistani nuclear ambitions. 
This stance ignored a nagging sense that Pakistan was heading towards the 
bomb. Harold Wilson and the FCO feared that with India having ‘gone nuclear’, 
Islamabad might decide to develop a nuclear capability, putting the NPT under 
increasing strain.39 As one of the architects of the NPT, a depository power, and the first 
state to ratify the treaty, this placed Wilson’s government in a tricky position. 
Washington shared the view that Islamabad had committed to the nuclear option, as 
State Department officials were ‘convinced that the Pakistanis would make every 
endeavour to develop a nuclear capability in as short a time as possible.’40 
The vexed question of Britain potentially selling arms to Pakistan as a means of 
heading off the nuclear quest was mired in misperceptions and economic problems. The 
parlous state of the British and Pakistani economies and Islamabad’s continued 
																																																								
37 Engel, Cold War at 30,000 Feet, 298. 
38 OPDO-SE, ‘Credit for Export of Defence Equipment to India’, 8 November, 1974, TNA CAB148/152, 2-4. 
39 Bridges to Dales, ‘Pakistan,’ 18 September, 1974, TNA FCO66/664; Thomson to Edmonds, ‘Pakistan,’ 25 
October, 1974, TNA FCO66/664. 
40 ‘Talks In State Department, October 2,’ 11 October, 1974, TNA FCO66/660, 3. 
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defaulting on previous deals meant that Britain preferred to deal in cash, not credit, for 
arms. It was a misunderstanding by the Pakistanis that there was a UK embargo in place 
similar to that of the United States, placing London firmly in the same camp as the 
Washington. However, the British position on arms sales was less to do with high-
minded concerns about the sub-continent and everything to do with the brutal economic 
necessities of the time. As long as Britain could maintain a good relationship with India, 
there might be commercial opportunities in relaxing the attitude towards Pakistan. As 
the FCO’s Richard Dales argued, Pakistan would get arms somehow and by denying 
sales, Britain was depriving itself of further revenue.41 In early December, OPD(O) 
clarified the arguments: economically, the Indian deal was not financially advantageous 
to Britain, but was extremely valuable in keeping production lines open and avoiding 
the loss of upwards of 1500 jobs in the aerospace industry. Politically, the main 
roadblock was that an early decision on Jaguar could prejudice Britain’s position at the 
May 1975 NPT Review Conference.42 When ministers came make a decision in January 
1975, they thus had to weigh up a tricky set of conflicting variables. 
 
‘A running sore’ 
In February 1975, Gerald Ford’s administration lifted the decade-old embargo on US 
arms sales to the sub-continent after persistent lobbying by Islamabad.43 Despite this, 
the administration knew that Pakistan was engaged in negotiations to obtain a full 
nuclear fuel cycle from France and hoped that the resumption of US supplies would 
move Pakistan off the nuclear path.44 The lifting of the embargo was subject to 
limitations: the US government would review sales on a case-by-case basis, credit for 																																																								
41 Dales to Bridges, ‘Defence Sales to Pakistan,’ 11 September, 1974, TNA FCO66/664, 1-2. 
42 OPDO-SE, ‘Credit for Export of Defence Equipment to India’, 6 December, 1974, TNA CAB148/152, 3. 
43 Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 217-219. 
44 ‘Pakistan and the Non-proliferation Issue,’ 22 January, 1975, The National Security Archive ‘Nuclear Vault’, 
Electronic Briefing Book 6, www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/docs/doc20.pdf (accessed on September 
9, 2014), Doc.20; Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 218 
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arms was unavailable, and (at least in the arrangement’s initial stages) all weapons sold 
must be purely ‘defensive.’45 This was not enough for the Pakistanis. The weapon that 
they really wanted was the advanced Vought A-7 attack aircraft, a system broadly 
comparable to the Jaguar in role and capability. Ford and Kissinger would eventually 
agree to sell Islamabad the A-7, but the aircraft remained a constant in US-Pakistani 
relations during the 1970s.  
 While the United States was lifting the arms embargo in an effort to restrain 
Islamabad, potential warplane sales to India and their symbolic impact on the global 
non-proliferation environment remained a major factor for the British government. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Wilson’s governments had – as John Thomson had argued 
in 1974 – taken a ‘strong and consistent stand’ on non-proliferation, the Jaguar and its 
place within non-proliferation diplomacy remained a complicating factor.46  Minister of 
State for Defence William Rodgers glossed over the non-proliferation implications of 
selling the aircraft when quizzed in Parliament on 23 January, preferring to concentrate 
on the benefits to British industry and the ability of the Indians to meet British credit 
terms.47 The Indian government was seeking generous terms of 2.5 per cent over 15-20 
years, when repayments over five years were the norm.48 The non-proliferation 
associations were recognised from Wilson on down, with Cabinet Secretary Sir John 
Hunt noting that ‘the sale of Jaguar could upset Pakistan and would need careful 
handling…because of the Jaguar’s nuclear associations.’ Hunt suggested it might be 
wise to delay any offer to India until after the 1975 NPT Review Conference, so as to 
																																																								
45 National Security Decision Memorandum 289, ‘US Military Supply Policy to Pakistan and India,’ 24 March, 1975, 
GRFPL, NSAF, Study Memoranda and Decision Memoranda, Box 1, 1. 
46 Thomson to Walker, ‘Non-proliferation and the Indian Nuclear Explosion,’ 6 August, 1974, TNA FCO66/657, 1. 
47 William Rodgers, House of Commons Debate, ‘Jaguar Aircraft,’ 23 January, 1975, Hansard Online 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1975/jan/23/jaguar-aircraft (accessed on 7 March, 2013). 
48 Hunt to Wilson, ‘Credit for Export of Defence Equipment to India,’ 27 January, 1975, TNA PREM16/1556. 
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‘avoid upsetting countries who might accuse us of providing India with the means of 
delivering a nuclear bomb.’49 
In the ministerial OPD, Wilson officially decided that while commercial credit 
terms would be offered for other defence sales (such as naval corvettes), if the Indians 
wished to purchase a Jaguar force, they would have to pay cash.50 The decision was, 
according to FCO minister David Ennals, not just about India’s financial position, but 
about Britain’s precarious situation, where offering lavish credit terms was simply 
infeasible.51 The British government hoped that the Indians would – in light of the US 
now being willing to arm Pakistan – still agree to meet their DPSA needs from a British 
source, despite the denial of credit. Whitehall informed the Indians that this decision 
was on economic grounds, even though media reporting suggested that non-
proliferation concerns were behind it.52 Once the Treasury had acquiesced to demands 
that a small number of aircraft be sold for cash (as long as there was no change to the 
position on credit), the Indian government expressed a willingness to procure a limited 
number of Jaguars with the expectation that they would – eventually – be allowed to 
purchase a much larger number.53 
The arguments made in favour of the deal were overwhelmingly economic: 
improving Britain’s balance of payments; keeping aircraft production lines open; 
maintaining employment; and improving prospects for further sales.54 Moreover, if 
Britain did not sell Jaguar, other competitors such as France or Sweden would sell an 
equivalent (although the Ford administration eventually persuaded Sweden to withdraw 																																																								
49 Ibid. Wilson approved Hunt’s recommendations in a marginal note. 
50 Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (hereafter OPD), ‘Minutes of a Meeting’, 28 January, 1975, TNA 
CAB148/154, 3 
51 Ennals to Rodgers, Letter, 11 March, 1975, TNA FCO37/1626. 
52 United Kingdom High Commission (hereafter UKHC) New Delhi to MoD, ‘Jaguar Sales,’ 24 February, 1975, 
TNA FCO37/1626; FCO to UKHC New Delhi, ‘Jaguar,’ 17 February, 1975, TNA FCO37/1626; Henry Stanhope, 
‘Indian jet deal founders,’ The Times, 7 March, 1975, 8. 
53 O’Neill to Wilford, ‘Sale of Jaguar Aircraft to India,’5  June, 1975, TNA FCO37/1627; Export Guarantees 
Committee, ‘Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee,’ 13 June, 1975, TNA T362/54, 1; France to Wright, Letter, 17 
June 1975, TNA T362/54. 
54 O’Neill to Wilford, ‘Sale of Jaguar Aircraft to India, Annex A’ 5 June, 1975, TNA FCO37/1627. 
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from the negotiations by refusing Stockholm permission to export aircraft powered by 
an American-designed engine, Washington arguing that it violated SAAB’s license 
production agreement).55  In a minor key, there were political arguments made in favour 
of the transaction, such as maintaining the relationship between the Labour Party and 
the aircraft industry trade unions (who were lobbying for the sale) and making sure that 
India retained some reliance on Britain in the face of increasing Soviet arms sales.56  
Opposition to the sale coalesced around the nuclear implications, even after the 
potential embarrassment of the May NPT Review Conference had passed. The ACDD 
persistently argued that the non-proliferation implications of even a limited number of 
aircraft were hugely significant. During intense early June 1975 debates, ACDD fought 
on alone and contended that the sale – even if it was on a cash basis for a small number 
of aircraft – was incompatible with Britain’s overall stance supporting the goals of 
global non-proliferation. Even though the version of the Jaguar that the UK proposed 
for India was not – without substantial modification – able to deliver nuclear weapons, 
the Pakistanis would think that the aircraft was adding to Indian nuclear capabilities.57  
ACDD contended that if the sale went ahead the government would be criticised 
domestically and internationally as symbolically validating India’s nuclear status.58 
Moreover, the Jaguar sale could be perceived by non-signatories of the NPT as 
legitimising their status: currently non-nuclear states (and here Pakistan was explicitly 
referenced) could go nuclear if they wished, and Britain would still sell them weapons.59 
Despite the hard line taken by the arms control officials, those on the other side of the 
debate argued that ‘we need more compelling reasons for turning down an order on cash 																																																								
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terms.’60 Regardless of ACDD’s objections, the FCO’s South Asian, Science, and 
Defence departments all agreed – with varying degrees of reservation – that the sale 
should go ahead.61 The SAD contended that it was possible for the aircraft to form the 
core of a small nuclear strike-force, but that India was too far away from producing a 
workable bomb for that to be a concern.62 
After this debate, senior ministers had to make the final decision. The response 
from Foreign Secretary James Callaghan came quickly: ‘Arms Control are right to put 
their case, but I think we cannot refuse the order.’63 On Callaghan’s behalf, his Assistant 
Private Secretary Richard Dales expanded upon the decision for Patrick Wright, 
Wilson’s Private Secretary for Overseas Affairs. Callaghan judged that although 
criticism on non-proliferation grounds could not be ruled out, Indian assurances of 
peaceful nuclear intentions should be taken into account and the effects on Britain’s 
balance of payments would be extremely welcome.64 Wilson was the final arbiter of any 
decision and, despite misgivings about the non-proliferation implications, approved 
pursuing the deal.65 Whitehall informed the British Embassy in Islamabad of the 
decision but asked diplomatic staff to keep quiet, as the FCO was well aware of 
Pakistan’s interest in the case.66 Further demonstration of the fact that – despite official 
hand wringing – preventing job losses, keeping the aerospace industry on a sound 
footing, and improving the balance of payments situation trumped non-proliferation 
came in a letter to Oliver Forster, Britain’s High Commissioner in New Delhi. Ministers 
had agreed that, even if India conducted another ‘peaceful nuclear explosion,’ the sale 
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would still go ahead. The only thing to potentially halt the sale would be an Indian 
admission that they had developed a nuclear weapon.67 
During the winter of 1975, arms control proponents within the FCO still argued 
that warplane sales to India would undermine non-proliferation efforts. John Thomson – 
highlighting Pakistan – contended that the impact on domestic and foreign opinion 
would be considerable, arguing that: 
The potential effect on opinion in this country, on opinion amongst the 
committed non-proliferation countries, e.g. the US, USSR, Japan, and on 
opinion in the potential exploders, e.g. Pakistan, Argentina, etc. It is this effect 
on opinion in these areas rather than in India itself which is the core of the non-
proliferation argument.68 
 
Furthermore, the problems of selling a very limited number of aircraft resurfaced. 
Thomson argued that, although paradoxical, it would be easier to justify – in non-
proliferation terms – the sale of 200 aircraft rather that 10 aircraft. Such a small number 
could only be conceived by India’s opponents as having an elite nuclear strike role.69 
 The protestations of the non-proliferationists notwithstanding, the scale of the 
deal began to increase. The Treasury remained opposed to providing extensive credit – 
indeed, one civil servant pungently described the entire issue as having been ‘a running 
sore for 3 years’ – but would eventually have to agree to £35 million of credit allocated 
to a cancelled corvette order being assigned to Jaguar.70 For OPD(O) meetings, the 
Ministry of Defence rehashed the arguments for the sale: avoiding the loss of over 1500 
jobs and keeping the production lines running.71 Even though some non-proliferation 
objections were acknowledged, Indian assurances to the Canadian government of 
peaceful intentions removed – at least in part – nuclear objections to the deal, which 
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assumed an even greater importance as the recession of the 1970s hit even harder.72 In 
OPD meetings on 9 and 28 October, ministers approved the transfer of £35 million of 
credit to the Jaguar deal. Twelve aircraft would be subsidised, while the Indians would 
be allowed to purchase an additional twenty-eight for cash.73 Non-proliferation was not 
even mentioned. 
In early 1976, it became apparent that in order to land the Jaguar contract, the 
offer needed sweetening. Secretary of State for Trade Peter Shore noted that France was 
a serious competitor, and Paris was offering a better deal to New Delhi.74 Shore 
suspected that the French Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, was preparing to ‘outflank’ 
Britain on a visit to India, hoping to sell the Mirage fighter-bomber. Consequently, 
Shore argued that the UK would need to increase the number of aircraft on offer and – 
potentially – offer credit terms, contending that there was no point in approaching the 
issue ‘in a half-hearted manner.’ In order to land the contract, the British government 
needed to offer serious terms and a serious number of aircraft.75 However, in the FCO, 
David Ennals saw little evidence for this French ‘outflanking’ suspecting that it might 
be an Indian tactic to get a better deal.76 By late spring, the Indians had asked BAC to 
submit proposals to provide 18-24 aircraft plus manufacturing facilities for domestic 
production of a much larger number.77 From the low point of the ‘10 Jaguars for cash’ 
plan, the number of aircraft involved in (and the revenue potentially generated by) the 
DPSA deal increased as the years passed. 
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The debates from 1974 to 1976 laid the foundations for arguments – internal and 
external – that continued for the next two years. During this time, there was little 
external criticism of the negotiations. When 1977 dawned, however, the United States 
were led by a president for whom nuclear and conventional arms control was an article 
of faith, and the British government would find that their potentially lucrative deal with 
New Delhi opposed by their most powerful ally. 
 
‘Push ahead with this sale’ 
Jimmy Carter had a deep-seated desire to address the spread of conventional and 
nuclear arms. A devout Southern Baptist, the new President sought to bring morality 
and humanitarianism – qualities notably lacking during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years 
– back to the centre of US foreign policy.78 In his inaugural address, Carter vouchsafed 
that his ultimate goal was ‘the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth.’79 As 
Andrew Preston has pointed out, Carter attempted to govern as both a moralist and a 
realist.80 Carter identified, as Betty Glad argues, US national interests with moral 
righteousness.81 Unlike late-period Ford, driven towards non-proliferation by public, 
Congressional, and electoral pressure, Carter – the only US president trained in nuclear 
physics – founded his passion for nuclear and conventional arms control in visions of a 
moral foreign policy driven by his personal commitment to human rights. Human rights, 
conventional arms sales, and non-proliferation were thus tied together. Buying weapons 
and warheads meant less for nations to spend on curing social ills such as poverty, thus 
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causing frustration and instability. Reducing expenditure on arms and preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons would result in a safer, more peaceful world with money to 
spend on combatting societal problems.82 Reflecting on the 1974 Indian nuclear test, 
Carter noted in his memoirs that he ‘wanted to do everything possible to prevent this 
capability from spreading to any additional nations.’83 
In the sub-continental context, a concrete outcome of Carter’s platform was the 
decision – made public during the summer of 1977 – to reverse Kissinger’s to supply A-
7’s to Pakistan. Now, the new administration would use consent to sell arms as a 
coercive, rather than persuasive, tool to encourage Pakistan to behave acceptably. The 
withdrawal of Kissinger’s offer came about because of Carter’s evolving policies on 
conventional arms sales and (most importantly for the sub-continent) mounting 
evidence that Pakistan was purchasing the French reprocessing plant as part of a nuclear 
weapons programme.84 
Domestic pressures in India had caused a slackening of the pace of the Jaguar 
negotiations in 1976. This was a critical year for the British economy, one that had a 
lasting impact on the then ruling Labour Party’s view of the United States. Not only had 
Harold Wilson resigned the premiership – with the ‘sturdy Atlanticist’ Jim Callaghan 
taking his place – in order to stave off a looming crisis that threatened to further 
destabilise Britain’s financial position, the government was required to ask for massive 
loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).85 The Labour Party held the United 
States responsible for the punishing strictures of the IMF agreement, which damaged 
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Labour’s vital relationship with the trade unions and finally contributed to the 
‘economic and social disarray’ of 1978/79’s ‘Winter of Discontent.’86 It was in this 
atmosphere of narrowly deflected crisis that Callaghan’s government continued its 
attempts to juggle economic and non-proliferation priorities when reinvigorated 
negotiations with India came under pressure from the US government. 
 
During 1977, British-Indian discussions underscored the possibility of a Jaguar 
sale to India and Pakistan. Although the Indians had repeatedly delayed negotiations, 
Callaghan’s government saw sales to New Delhi as the better commercial prospect. 
Indian representatives had made clear to the new Foreign Secretary David Owen that 
theirs was an entirely peaceful nuclear programme, and that there was no political 
obstacle to correcting the Indo-UK trade imbalance.87 Owen felt that the Jaguar sale 
would have ‘great symbolic importance’, while the FCO’s PUS Sir Michael Palliser 
commented that it would be a ‘shot in the arm for British trade.’88 This came at a point 
when Callaghan’s government sought to review their entire policy towards India. OPD 
reflected on the dual significance of reducing Britain’s trade deficit with India and the 
political importance of providing an alternative to the Soviet Union.89 Owen’s 
continued enthusiasm for the deal was at odds with his professed commitment to arms 
control and non-proliferation. Christopher Mallaby, ACDD chief during Owen’s time at 
the FCO, recalled that his superior displayed great enthusiasm for arms control and non-
proliferation matters, issues that the Foreign Secretary saw as vote winners for Labour 
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and a means of increasing his own popularity and standing. 90 In particular, Owen was – 
according to his own recollection – deeply concerned about proliferation, particularly in 
the cases of Pakistan and South Africa.91 Indeed, in one of his early meetings with 
Vance, Owen emphasised that ‘the British government were taking the non-proliferation 
issue very seriously indeed.’92 
British diplomats argued that the effort to stimulate Pakistani interest, limited as 
it was, must be concealed from the Indians.93 During US-UK discussions that covered 
arms sales and the nuclear issue, US ambassador to Pakistan Arthur Hummel attempted 
to pressure his counterparts into not selling the Jaguar to any sub-continental state. The 
British side, knowing the stipulations of Carter’s position on conventional arms sales, 
argued that the Jaguars were not an ‘improvement’ on weapons already in the region.94 
When Cyrus Vance briefed Carter for an upcoming visit to India, British arms sales 
loomed large on the agenda. Following on from the US policy of restraint in arms sales 
to South Asia – typified by the A-7 decision – Vance urged Carter to request that India 
show similar restraint in its own arms purchases. Tacitly, this meant not purchasing 
Jaguar.95  
The issues of the Pakistani nuclear programme and British arms sales collided in 
Washington on 2 December when American officials strongly implied to their UK 
colleagues  that a British deal to sell Jaguars to India would push Pakistan even further 
down the nuclear path.96 This came on the back of summertime hints to the FCO’s 
Deputy Under-secretary Hugh Cortazzi that the Carter administration disapproved of 																																																								
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the sale.97 Richard Ericsson (of the State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military 
Affairs) outlined the ‘difficult’ American decision to halt the A-7 sale and the serious 
domestic consequences this entailed for the administration and the manufacturer. The 
Jaguar, the Americans argued, was qualitatively superior to any other aircraft in the 
region and an Indian purchase could provoke Pakistan to ‘escalation and an arms 
race.’98 Donald Murray, the British delegation’s leader, questioned ‘the validity of 
American fears that selling Jaguars to India would encourage the Pakistanis towards a 
nuclear capability’ and characterised American opposition as being founded in an 
‘outmoded’ view of the sub-continent and because of US manufacturers’ fury at 
Carter’s A-7 decision. Furthermore, there was also a European dimension. Murray 
contended that if Britain withdrew from competition, ‘the unscrupulous French’ would 
pick up the contract with their Mirage aircraft.99 Callaghan’s government would 
therefore be depriving the country of valuable export earnings while doing nothing to 
alter the situation on the sub-continent.100 Murray’s contentions were, at the very least, 
disingenuous given the British government’s  knowledge of the non-proliferation 
implications.  
In London, the SAD outlined the compelling (and overwhelmingly economic) 
reasons for ignoring the US protestations: if the sale did not go ahead, aircraft 
production lines may have to close and Britain’s overall aircraft sales strategy would 
suffer a setback. In terms of foreign affairs, India would perceive this as a judgement on 
them and more widely, it would appear as if the British government had capitulated in 
the face of American demands.101 Despite awareness of the nuclear and strategic 
implications, Foreign Secretary David Owen accepted the arguments in favour of the 																																																								
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sale and on 21 December, he dispatched a note to his subordinates: ‘I agree completely. 
Push ahead with this sale. If we can land it, I will be pleased.’102  
Unlike Owen, the US State Department was most certainly not pleased. Even 
though the US Ambassador in London had acknowledged the primacy of commercial 
interests in British decision-making and Arthur Hummel in Islamabad concluded that 
the costs to US-UK relations of further pressure over the Jaguar deal were unacceptable, 
on the very last day of December 1977, the State Department continued to argue that the 
Indian Jaguar purchase would ‘cause considerable alarm in Pakistan and could set off an 
arms race in South Asia.’103 Such was the American concern regarding Jaguar, senior 
figures within the administration recommended that Carter put pressure on Indian Prime 
Minister Morarji Desai, as further demands on the UK might seriously damage the 
trans-Atlantic relationship.104 Moreover, the National Security Council (NSC) 
recommended that the US should do everything it could to prevent the sale.105 Given the 
mounting evidence of Pakistani nuclear intentions, there was clearly a fear was that this 
‘arms race’ would further alter the strategic balance and eventually involve a further 
push towards atomic capability on Islamabad’s part. 
 
Into 1978, bilateral US-UK discussions demonstrated that the Carter administration saw 
arms sales as a coercive or persuasive non-proliferation tool. This was in contrast to a 
British government that wilfully deprioritised the non-proliferation implications of the 
Jaguar deal. London saw no problem in continuing to market the Jaguar to India, selling 
a warplane known to have a tactical nuclear role to the nation whose conventional and 																																																								
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nuclear superiority to Pakistan was the major motivating factor for Islamabad’s atomic 
programme. 
             In January 1978, Jim Callaghan made an official visit to the sub-continent. A 
major objective was to reduce the trade imbalance, with Jaguar forming a significant 
part of this.106 Even though the Jaguar deal and non-proliferation matters would be 
significant areas of discussion, the two were to be kept quite separate.107 In New Delhi, 
Desai equivocated, suggesting that – although a team from the UK would shortly be 
invited to India for discussions – the aircraft might not be entirely suitable for Indian 
needs. Callaghan argued that India’s Soviet MiG-21 fighters in combination with Jaguar 
would provide for an impressive defensive and offensive air force.108 At no point did 
non-proliferation and the Jaguar deal cross paths. 
              In July 1978, Joseph Nye – chair of the NSC’s group on nuclear non-
proliferation – called on the FCO’s Joint Nuclear Unit chief Robert Alston to discuss 
Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and security anxieties. The Pakistanis had become 
increasingly nervous about their security situation, as the communist coup in 
neighbouring Afghanistan at the end of April had installed the pro-Soviet government 
of Nur Muhammad Taraki. Nye and his colleagues worried that Pakistan might make 
moves away from the West, towards non-aligned status by leaving the crumbling 
Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and go all out for the nuclear weapons option if 
not suitably reassured by its allies. The State Department remained concerned about the 
still unresolved Jaguar arrangement with India. Nye wondered if, given Pakistan’s 
sensitivity, the UK might not consider delaying or halting the deal.109 Here, the US 
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explicitly attempted to pressure the UK government into abandoning the Jaguar deal on 
non-proliferation grounds. 
FCO officials thought the American attitude hypocritical given that the US was 
considering the sale of F-5 fighter aircraft to Pakistan in an attempt to assuage security 
concerns and ameliorate Pakistani annoyance at the various non-proliferation efforts.110 
British intransigence regarding the Jaguar’s sale – a sale that was still in competition 
with French aircraft manufacturers – went all the way to the top. Owen, despite his 
trans-Atlantic inclinations and warm personal relationship with Vance, had forcefully 
committed himself to the deal in 1977 and saw no reason to delay or halt the proposed 
sale.111 Owen angrily commented that, ‘We should look after our relations with the 
Pakistanis, the Americans can look after theirs.’112 Although British ambassador John 
Bushell in Islamabad appreciated that the Jaguar negotiations were a complicating 
factor in British-Pakistani relations, he did not expect it to cause particular problems.113 
Word from New Delhi indicating that British procrastination might result in India 
making this valuable purchase from France was a further factor accounting for British 
determination.114 A contract worth hundreds of millions of pounds would be a fillip to 
the ailing (and now nationalised) British aerospace industry and a feather in the cap of a 
government under serious economic pressure. 
Much to Owen’s annoyance, Carter took on board the advice he had been given 
in late 1977 by personally attempting to discourage the Indian purchase. Anglo-Indian 
discussions had resulted in a much larger potential order, to the tune of 40 UK 
manufactured aircraft and upwards of 150 examples produced in India using British 																																																								
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components.115 Carter, in correspondence with Desai, emphasised his policy of 
restricting the supply of advanced weapons to the sub-continent, arguing that such 
supplies could precipitate an arms race and disrupt the delicate regional balance.116 In 
addition to this intervention, Vance also warned Indian Minister of External Affairs Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee that the acquisition of Jaguar could only have a harmful and 
destabilising effect on the region and potentially cause a rift in US-Indian relations.117 
The mood in Whitehall was not lightened when word filtered through that senior State 
Department official Eric David Newsom had approached the British High Commission 
in New Delhi seeking to measure Indian tolerance for the sale of American combat 
aircraft to Pakistan.118  
British officials appreciated that there was genuine alarm in Islamabad regarding 
the Afghan situation, a circumstance not helped by perceptions of a relatively relaxed 
American attitude towards Afghanistan and the ever-present worries about India.119 The 
British Embassy in Islamabad suggested that a way around the problem posed by Indian 
rearmament might be to resurrect the old idea of offering the aircraft for sale to India 
and Pakistan, thereby putting both sides on an equal footing.120 Owen, angered by 
American interference in what could be a lucrative commercial transaction, became 
increasingly intransigent and argued that the Pakistanis had been aware of the 
negotiations for some time now and he had even recently mentioned it to the Pakistani 
Foreign Minister.121 
Owen took the opportunity to plead the British case to a wider audience at the 
G-7 summit in Bonn. At a quadripartite foreign ministers’ meeting involving Owen, 																																																								
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Vance, Louis de Guiringaud of France, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher of West Germany, 
the Foreign Secretary admitted that, yes, the situation had contributed to regional 
concerns, but that Britain had offered to sell the aircraft to India and Pakistan. The 
British government could not help it, Owen contended, if Pakistan was not interested in, 
or lacked the money for, the Jaguar. According to the Foreign Secretary, the UK had 
taken a measured attitude, kept the Pakistanis informed, and believed that in the final 
analysis, the sale would not be taken as a ‘tilt’ against Pakistan.122 
In the end, American protestations came to naught. Despite persistent delays and 
extensions to the decision deadline, on October 1978, Indian Prime Minister Moraji 
Desai’s government – having visited Britain during the summer and deliberately 
excluded Jaguar from discussions – made the decision to buy the warplane to fulfil the 
DPSA role for the Indian Air Force (IAF). 123 The IAF would purchase 40 complete 
aircraft – worth £260 million – from Britain and license produce upwards of 150 
more.124 Callaghan was ‘naturally delighted’ and hoped for a ‘deepening and widening’ 
of Britain’s collaboration with India.125 By July 1979, the first aircraft had landed at 
Jamnagar airbase and the IAF entered a new era of sophistication.126 
 
Conclusion 
From 1974 to 1978, British efforts to sell the nominally nuclear capable Jaguar strike 
aircraft to India were plagued by debates over the non-proliferation implications. In 
pursuing this sale, the Wilson and Callaghan governments chose to gloss over the 
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complications, indicating that, although India had joined the ‘nuclear club’, the 
consequences would be slight. This brings into question the Wilson and Callaghan 
government’s commitment to non-proliferation when British economic interests were 
on the line. Indeed, there was very little genuine opposition to the sale on non-
proliferation grounds within the government, other than that emanating from the ACDD, 
the one department institutionally committed to non-proliferation. Britain’s dire 
economic situation in the 1970s was the main concern. Without massive external deals, 
the teetering British aerospace industry would collapse, sending thousands more 
workers into the unemployment lines. Additionally, British officials could not 
countenance withdrawing from the bidding process and gifting ‘the unscrupulous 
French’ a lucrative contract. For Jimmy Carter’s administration, the consequence of this 
was frustration at British intransigence over the Jaguar. 
While Jaguars did not represent a significant increase in Indian capability, it was 
the symbolism of Pakistan’s rivals being equipped with modern weapons that could 
potentially act as nuclear delivery systems (while the United States was using similar 
weapon systems as ‘carrots and sticks’ in its dealings with Islamabad) that was the 
underlying problem. The British government – faced with the potential loss of a hugely 
lucrative arms deal – thus wilfully ignored the non-proliferation complications and the 
symbolism of the aircraft. The sheer commitment to the Jaguar deal demonstrates that, 
in the face of an economic crisis, the British government – despite being fully aware of 
the non-proliferation implications and the symbolism of the Jaguar, and having a long-
standing commitment to non-proliferation goals – was quite willing to subordinate non-
proliferation to economic necessity. 
Interestingly, Anglo-American nuclear non-proliferation cooperation on the sub-
continent was not destroyed by the Jaguar deal. After the resolution of the affair, US-
UK cooperation became, if anything, even closer. Both states worked together to end 
the Franco-Pakistani reprocessing plant imbroglio. Furthermore, Washington and 
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London formed a strong and lasting partnership in their efforts to halt the clandestine 
element of Islamabad’s nuclear programme, the uranium enrichment project.127 
In the case of South Asia in the 1970s, Britain did have a commitment to non-
proliferation goals. The UK fought alongside the USA to prevent Pakistani acquisition 
of ‘the bomb’ in the late 1970s, even when it looked like the prospects of persuading 
Islamabad to give up any nuclear aspirations were slim. Nevertheless, the Jaguar affair 
is highly significant, as it reveals a different dimension to British pursuit of non-
proliferation. The fiscal deterioration of the 1970s placed Wilson and Callaghan in a 
situation where they could either pursue non-proliferation at all times and deepen 
Britain’s financial misery, or they could deliberately ignore the possible ramifications of 
the Jaguar sale and alleviate some of their monetary problems. When it came to a 
contest between symbolism and hard economic reality, the two Labour Prime Ministers 
simply ‘could not refuse the order.’ 
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